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After three decades of rapid economic growth, China is experiencing shortages of energy 
resources in domestic production. The initiative to revive The New Silk Road project is to 
secure access to cheap supplied sources from Central Asia. Although Central Asian countries 
understand the hazards of exploitation of natural resources, they are willing to receive 
investments from China that would, it is hoped, equalize their economy with the world market 
as the growth of those countries has been undeveloped for the last 25 years.  
 
Despite the wide range of development investments in Central Asia and Uzbekistan, this thesis 
research will focus on transportation infrastructures and cross border developments across 
the region by determining possible obstacles to and opportunities for realising the project in 
practice. The theoretical evidence will assist on assessment of those projects by providing real 
case examples.  
 
A fundamental overview of OBOR initiatives in this thesis research provides a clear 
understanding of the intentions behind the project while presenting the possibilities of gaining 
mutual economic advantages for both China and Central Asian regions. 
Keywords: OBOR, Central Asia, Uzbekistan, Transportation Infrastructure, 
Development 
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1 Introduction 
 
China has been transformed from an extremely poor economy in early 1950s into today’s 
world economic giant. Economic reforms from centrally-planned to market-based 
economy produced rapid economic growth and societal development. In roughly two 
decades, the economic reforms have positively reflected on the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of China by placing it as the second largest economy in the world after the United 
States (US).  
 
The rapid infrastructural development and surplus productive capacity have also 
impacted negatively on the economy of China. As part of its effort to rebalance, China 
announced to launch One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project, with initiatives that involve 
about 65 per cent of the world’s population.  
 
The coherence of OBOR project is intended to solve domestic economic issues as well 
as assisting the economic development of the countries involved. The distribution of 
financial funding for infrastructure developments and the spread of national currency 
renminbi (RMB) in transactional operations represent the expansion of Chinese power 
in developing countries by placing the China in a position of global leadership.  
 
Already invested in volatile Central Asian (CA) countries, China is expecting to create a 
stable economy by constructing new roads, railroads, and gas, oil pipelines in territories 
with endowed natural resources. The practicality of the project enables China to attract 
Central Asian countries with these initiatives to develop their economies and at the same 
time realising for China imports of energy resources from those regions. The implications 
of transportation development initiatives in Uzbekistan include a potentially significant 
role in its economic development by reducing poverty in the country.   
 
The development of transport infrastructure raises scepticism regarding the investments 
of China in practice reducing poverty levels in Central Asian countries. The realisation of 
the OBOR project implies a central focus on its own economic and financial needs, while 
the secondary issues of poverty reduction elsewhere might not exactly correspond with 
the initial plans of China. In addition, the initiated cross-border trade operations between 
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CA regions have also aroused concerns and challenges whether it improves the trade 
or deteriorates due the regional conflicts and low levels of economic development. 
 
 Although already well established, the OBOR plan remains unprecedented in many 
areas of development projects. However, the planned investments in immense 
transportation infrastructures have the potential to influence the economy of CA countries 
by developing mutual benefits within the project initiatives.  
 
 The objectives  
 
The endeavours of China to globalize the OBOR project have significant implications for 
the economy of Central Asian countries and across the world. In this thesis, it is aimed 
to provide a fundamental overview of China’s OBOR initiatives and strategies, focusing 
on Central Asian countries and particularly Uzbekistan. This thesis analyses the possible 
strategic outcomes of infrastructure investments for the economy by comparing these 
with economic transportation development theories. Possible outcomes will be assessed 
by taking account of the potential negative impacts and benefits of the funded projects. 
The objective of this research is to examine the intentions of China’s OBOR initiatives 
with respect to both economic and political factors, and to provide better understanding 
of the project implications. Further research and analysis will attempt to identify the 
obstacles to the development of the economies affected, and the possibilities for these 
to be integrated into global economic circuits as a result of the investments in 
transportation developments.  
  
 Thesis Research  
 
The main aim of the research is to analyse the process of OBOR development and its 
expansion across the world by identifying and measuring the investments in developing 
countries, intended to boost the economic growth of those countries. The first chapter 
serves as an introduction to the thesis research. Chapter 2 focuses on the economic 
development of China to the present day. Within the chapter, in sections (from 2.1 – 2.3) 
the OBOR project initiatives will be described and analysed by comparing them to aid 
programs for developing countries, while simultaneously facilitating China’s goal of 
expanding use of its currency in transactional operations. The chapter provides a 
fundamental introduction to the implemented projects in Central Asia and the specific 
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country case of Uzbekistan. Chapter 3 will provide a theoretical assessment of 
transportation infrastructure development on poverty reduction by including the hindering 
factors which might obstruct its achievement.  Finally, in chapter 4 the study will focus 
on China’s potentially hidden plans behind the OBOR initiatives, and whether these 
correspond with the economic development goals of Central Asian countries.  
  
This thesis attempts to provide an answer to the research question: What are the 
influences of transportation infrastructure on economic development, and what are the 
expected benefits for China and the CA countries from the One Belt, One Road initiative?  
 
 Methodology  
 
The thesis methodology is conducted as an exploratory study based only on secondary 
research. Exploratory research is a suitable method of investigation as it aims to explore 
the research topic across various aspects and provide insights about the subject matter 
with respect to both the obstacles it faces and solutions to these. In the context of OBOR, 
the reason for China’s expansion across the world, the investment initiatives and their 
influence on developing countries, with the possibility of improvements to the local 
economy, will be analysed. It is not aimed to provide a conclusive answer. Nevertheless, 
it should provide a deeper understanding of the One Belt, One Road initiative and 
associated issues.  
  
The chosen methodology enables exploration of the research topic with wide range of 
causal factors and options for potential solutions to problems without reaching a definitive 
conclusion. As a result, this study could be used as a basis for other, more conclusive 
research studies.    
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2 China from developing to globally developed economy  
 
China experienced rapid economic growth after the economic reforms beginning in 1978. 
In the early 1980s, by adopting market-oriented reforms in the economy, China focused 
on land privatization to attract more foreign investment and realise greater foreign trade 
in the economy development. (Liu 2016: 37).  In the following decades, China created a 
new economic model, taking the examples of neighbouring countries Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan and adjusting them to its own economic conditions. (Gabuev 2017). Furthermore, 
in the early 2000s, huge infrastructural developments in regions and the entry to various 
international organisations such as World Trade Organisation (WTO) were the moments 
of economic integration with the global economy.   China became the largest trading 
country in the world (Liu 2016: 37). 
 
In recent decades, starting from the economic reforms in 1978-2005, the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of China increased on average 9.6% per year (Holz 2008) and China is 
now considered to be the second largest economy in the world after the United States. 
According to a World Bank study, it could even overtake the US GDP. For example, in 
2014, Europe was China’s largest export market and China began investing in EU market 
at around $9.8 billion (Liu 2016: 37). 
 
The new, reformed model of China for its domestic development has significantly 
influenced its economic growth. However, the accelerated infrastructure development 
and industrial production have generated shortages of raw materials, energy, and a 
surplus of productive capacity in the country. The production imbalance has created 
economic instability and an increase of inequality in the domestic economy (Brookings 
2017). The impact of such changes is reflected via the decrease of domestic growth. To 
stabilize the economy, the Chinese government implemented numerous strategic 
initiatives both for internal and external operations.  
 
One of the most prominent solutions for the external initiatives is the “One Belt One 
Road” economic project to reduce financial instability, strengthen infrastructure and 
stabilize the raw materials capacity (Hancock 2017). The OBOR project realisation 
ultimately originated from China’s domestic economic policies, but with geostrategic 
consequences. The plan is to reach Europe from China across the Central Asia 
territories. Simultaneously there is the maritime route, starting from China through 
Southeast Asia to South Asia, Africa (Dollar 2015).  As OBOR began to improve the 
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domestic economy, additionally, China’s interest was also to become the main global 
economic player involving the strategically important partner countries into the project, 
with the goal of reaching strategic parity with the US in Asia by reshaping its security 
environment to provide that economic growth will be stable (Brookings 2017). 
 
 One Belt, One Road 
 
One Belt, One Road was named after the ancient Silk Road trade routes which were 
established in the beginning of 10 century A.D. At that time, Chinese domestics produced 
products; silk, tea, porcelain and other luxury goods transported via ancient trade routes 
connecting China to Central Asia, the Arab nation and Europe. The Silk Road was the 
main vehicle of development and cultural product expansion across the nations for 
several centuries (Jinchen 2016).  
 
To revive the ancient Silk Road, the Chinese president Xi Jinping announced The New 
Silk Road (NSR) initiative project for the first time in Kazakhstan in 2013 (Junxian & Yan 
2016: 105). In the proposal, as well as later in The State Authorized plan in 2015 (NDRC 
2015), it is aimed to establish a modern railways, highways, pipelines and utility grids 
which will connect China with the rest of Central, West and South Asian countries, and 
Africa, with the delivery point to Europe (Figure 1). Established as the world’s largest 
platform for the economic cooperation, China also plans to develop coordination, trade, 
and financial collaboration, as well as to expand social and cultural cooperation between 
the involved countries (NDRC 2015). “One Belt, One Road” is also recognised as the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Silk Road Ecоnomic Belt (SREB), and the New Silk 
Road (NSR). Due to the numerous misinterpretations from the involved parties, it has 
been renamed to change the perception (Belt and Road 2017). In this paper, it will use 
the most common acronym, OBOR, to avoid the confusion. 
 
The OBOR project is also intended to include the new 21st century Maritime Silk Road 
connecting China to Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. 
The maritime project is focused on enhancing maritime cooperation with nine South East 
Asian states creating together the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for better 
future prospects (Figure 1) (ASEAN) (Jinchen 2016).  
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Figure 1 The map of the New Silk Road and Maritime Road (Jinshen 2016) 
 
 
The map reveals the road journey starting from the east north of China regions through 
Central Asia, the Middle East and on to Europe, and the maritime route from China to 
Southeast Asia and then to Africa. 
 
The projected outcomes of the project reveal mutual strategic benefits between the 
various parties. According to Sternberg, Ahearn & McConnell’s recently published report 
(2017:3), the key factors of realising the project are as follows:  
 
- Internationalisation of the Yuan  
- Infrastructure development in Asia  
- Reduction of overproduction, overcapacity, excess products 
- Reduction of unskilled unemployment in China  
- Improvement of regional transport skills  
- Increased access to natural resources, oil, gas 
- Increased Chinese soft power and good will 
- Foreign policy initiative  
- Sino-centric unipolar Asia 
- Road to empire 
- Benefits of development and prosperity  
- Enhancement of Chinese social stability and security  
- Central Asia as “key areas” for China’s national energy security 
- Integrate Eurasian continent by 2050   
 
(Sternberg, Ahearn & McConnell 2017:3) 
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China focused on investing in all types of infrastructure developments; constructing oil 
and gas pipelines, extending new roads and railway projects, mining natural resources, 
and realising hydropower projects across the Central Asian regions. The rapid 
investment initiatives of China are discussed above (Chapter 2), and have resulted in 
shortages of energy and natural resources.  
 
Therefore, before the official launch of the OBOR plan, China was already investing in 
the reconstruction of oil pipelines in Kazakhstan and gas pipelines in Turkmenistan, 
preventing the dependence on gas from Russia, whilst developing another pipeline that 
accelerated the flow of oil delivered from Russia to China. (Financial Times. 2016).  The 
strategic plan of China on investing in infrastructures considers the exploitation of natural 
resources from the neighbouring CA regions where they are easily accessible and 
relatively cheap (Tang 2015).  Additionally, the OBOR project considers the strategic 
implications for developing countries, economic integration, and connecting CA regions 
with the rest of world market (Sternberg et al. 2017:4). 
 
2.1.1 China’s Marshall Plan   
 
Ambitiously, China plans to a global expansion by investing about $1 trillion in 
infrastructure involving about 60 countries altogether. The funding is accumulated from 
China Development Bank (CDA), Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC), Silk Road Fund 
(SRF), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), New Development Bank (NDB) and 
state owned commercial banks (Figure 2) (Wildau & Ma 2017). Massive investment 
initiatives promise economic prosperity, for both China and those countries receiving the 
investment. China’s wealth and its surplus of steel, cement, and machinery will be shared 
with developing countries as it becomes more global in providing infrastructural 
development and economic growth (The New York Times. 2017).  
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Figure 2. Finding for OBOR projects by source. (Wildau & Ma 2017) 
 
The OBOR initiative has been compared to the US Marshall Plan. At the end of World 
War II (WW II), the US was best equipped with industrial materials. Low domestic 
consumption in the US caused the economic growth to decrease. To avoid industrial 
overcapacity, the US began to transfer resources to Europe by aiming to rebuild 
destroyed cities. After five decades, the rapid growth of China brings similar experience 
of excess capacity, and resource and labour shortages, so it needs to export overseas 
to achieve economic stability in the country (The Diplomat 2016). Therefore, most 
Chinese media regard The New Silk Road as equivalent to the Marshall Plan, given the 
attention to providing economic prosperity for developing countries.  
 
Several resources (Ling 2015) imply that due to the financial challenges and instability 
worldwide, the OBOR plan will increase the infrastructure investment in developing 
countries by building opportunities for these.  By expanding the requirement orders in 
infrastructure will result on equal winning both for developing and developed countries. 
These investments will boost economic reconstruction and reduce the lingering impact 
of the financial crisis. As a result, developing countries can obtain better infrastructure 
development opportunities and economic growth. In the perfectly organized plan, it 
creates a global economic and strategic cooperation, where each involved country could 
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adopt its own financial policy and increase capacity in infrastructure to create satisfaction 
for both parties.  
 
However, implementing huge projects like OBOR involves political and security issues 
between countries, potentially causing geopolitical conflicts. This is also the case in 
Central Asia where five former Soviet Union countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan grouped in one region. Even if those countries 
share a similar culture, religion, and language, it is crucial to consider also their 
economic, political and foreign policies. These five countries have challenges 
cooperating with each other over territorial conflicts1, national identity and water 
disputes2. For example, the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan included in their 
development strategies the priority focus on “national security” and “domestic political 
stability and the consolidation of society” (Hongzhou 2015). A strong national security 
orientation creates challenges for integration, especially with China’s OBOR initiatives to 
develop the infrastructural economy in Central Asian regions.  
 
In recent years, billions of dollars invested in Central Asian development programs were 
concentrating more also on water deficiency issues. Already before OBOR, China started 
to consider the water crises issues between regions. Due to that, there are numerous 
investments in building water dam infrastructures to prevent water conflicts between CA 
regions in the future (Chugh 2017).  
 
China’s strategic initiatives to involve the CA countries in its OBOR project is to receive 
in return a big part of the CA energy, oil, gas market as already a quarter of oil production 
from Kazakhstan is under the control of Chinese enterprises (see Appendix 2 (2)).  These 
highly ambitious investments, and China’s control over the natural resources, have the 
potential to transform the CA economies in the future (The Diplomat 2016).  
 
 
 
 
1 The conflict between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan remains unresolved due to the 
controversial issues of claiming the piece of land Fergana Valley. In 2012-2013, on the border of 
Kyrgyz-Uzbek occurred 38 security incidents and 37 on the Kyrgyz-Tajik borders. 
2 Water management of both rivers Amu Darya and Sir Darya, of which 75 per cent of water is 
used for agricultural irrigation, creates competition between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan to reserve the water resources.  
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2.1.2 Free trade. Internationalism  
 
The initiatives of China to develop the economy of CA by realising at the same time its 
domestic strategy plans correspond ideally the OBOR project as China’s own Marshall 
Plan. Moreover, by investing in infrastructural projects in developing countries and 
realising the development processes, China will increase the use of its currency for 
transactional operations between the involved countries. The initiatives have already 
been implemented as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently added the Chinese 
renminbi (RMB) to the international currency basket. The inclusion of RMB is a potential 
opportunity for the integration of China into the global financial system, and the IMF’s 
recognition of RMB expands both its role in trade and its international use globally (IMF 
2016).  
 
China’s future plan for RMB is to build a strong currency during the OBOR financial 
transactions and investments in involved countries which, as a result, will create easier 
commodity trade between the regions by expanding use of the RMB currency across the 
world. (The Diplomat 2016).  
 
As Jack Yang head of renminbi business at the economics and strategic planning 
department, Bank of China points out about the RMB currency:  
 
"Renminbi needs an opportunity to internationalise, it cannot do that in the mature 
currency market where the dollar is the dominant currency…But it can create a 
market among developing countries along OBOR. Many of these countries need 
foreign investment, and renminbi can become the mainstream [currency] there." 
    
                         (Sin 2017) 
 
The initiatives of expanding the RMB currency has been already visible investments 
overseas of China, where, in 2015, OBOR related investments rose 36.7 per cent to 
$13.7 billion. Consequently, financing for OBOR projects will be increasing yearly to 
sustain infrastructure developments and expand possibilities to implement financial 
transactions with the RMB. Thus, it will keep developing the RMB recognition globally by 
attracting slowly foreign investors (Financial Times. 2016).   
 
Already the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), under the OBOR projects 
draw guidelines on economic and financial systems to countries as Mongolia, Russia, 
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In this operations, 
Mongolia has been the first initiated in RMB cаpital market (Hong 2015).  
 
 
 China in Central Asia  
 
All geographically landlocked CA countries are endowed with natural resources (Figure 
3) such as oil and gas, coal and mineral resources that China plans via OBOR initiatives 
to import for its domestic needs (Rastogi, Cordula, & Jean-François Arvis 2014: 19).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Central Asian Energy resources. (CAREC 2010) 
 
Today, China has become the leading economic partner in natural resource extraction 
projects with subsidized investments in infrastructure and relatively low interest loans.  
With this initiative, more than ten per cent of oil and gas exported from Central Asia goes 
to China (Figure 4). The relationship in trade between those countries is increasing 
whereby CA countries receive the advantages from these operations (Mariani 2013: 13).  
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Figure 4. China’s trade data with Central Asia (2012) (Source: Mariani 2013:13) 
 
However, the continuous intervention with CA countries might be challenging in political 
and economic terms, since the former Soviet Union countries are still ruled by 
authoritarian regimes with different political systems. For example, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan countries are less liberal than Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan, which influences their mutual economic operations (Mazhikeyev, Edwards 
& Rizov. 2014).  
 
Despite having no clear guidelines in infrastructure plans, China has already taken the 
initiative to develop the CA regions despite the fact of regional conflicts between 
countries as well as the presence of dominant economic force countries such as Russia 
and the US. Russian economic dominance in CA regions has been playing a significant 
role since their independence. Russia places its role as a politically dominant, supreme 
power in providing military presence, economic trade for export and import operations. 
Also culturally, language (Russian) and alphabet (Cyrillic vs. Latin) are key criteria with 
its former republics (Diener cited in Sternberg,T et al. 2017: 5). CA regions are still in 
economic trade connected with Russia (Figure 5).  For example, Russia exports 90 per 
cent of petroleum products to Tajikistan, while Kyrgyzstan receives 92 per cent of fuel. 
At the same time, Russia imports from Uzbekistan natural gas whereas region with 
largest population in CA consumes produced natural gas internally. (Mitchell 2014).  
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Figure 5. Trade between Russian Federation and Central Asia countries (2000-2011) 
(Sinitsina 2012: 8) 
 
Russia as a leader still has the economic influence in CA countries, thus, in economic 
opportunities, Russia considers China not objectively a competitor, especially for 
countries as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan where most of the population work in Russia 
(Vedomosti 2015). 
 
However, China is seeking to develop the market of CA regions globally for its strategic 
plans without changing the political relationship with other countries.  It can change the 
alignment of forces in the countries especially after the decline in commodity prices and 
the recession in Russia due to the EU sanctions (Vedomosti 2015). 
 
In this context, a former chairman of Russian Railways, Vladimir Yakunin comments that:  
 
“China is attempting to create a new type of development model, without shaking 
up the existing world power…China is very clear: it does not seek to replace the 
US as the only dominating power”   
     (Sin 2017) 
 
The ambitious involvement of China in CA is based on its domestic strategy regarding 
economic needs and geopolitical expansions. This strategy includes massive financial 
support in all sectors of infrastructure development which will sustain the economic 
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growth of CA countries. Central Asia, after a long period of stagnation, needs 
investments to strengthen the economy.  The economist of CA regions Agris Preymanis 
(UNIAN 2015) regarding this, points out that because it is less likely that Western or 
Russian capital will take the initiative to invest in the various sectors of development, 
China’s contribution is very welcome.  
 
In 2013, when the Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the OBOR project without 
including in its plans Russia as a strategic partner, Vladimir Putin considered China’s 
Marshall Plan as a threat to take over control of the CA regions (Gabuev 2015). However, 
the plans of OBOR are driven by domestic economic concerns, and China is seeking 
partners to implement the project rather than take over control from existing political 
rulers. Therefore, in the following years of OBOR plan, China is actively beginning 
partnership with Russia with initiatives to preserve the latter’s political and economic 
ambitions in countries where it has implemented projects.  
 
China for CA countries will be a trading partner and investor in projects while Russia will 
remain its dominance in cultural and political operations. The governments of CA now 
can view Chinese investments as the last chance to stimulate the economy and preserve 
political stability (Vedomosti 2015.). OBOR offers economic opportunities as CA is 
currently in need after continuous economic recession and dependence on Russia.  For 
instance, after the announcement of OBOR initiatives among the CA countries, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan revealed their domestic interest to develop 
economic growth (Hongzhou 2015: 6). However, the dependence of CA on Russia in 
political and economic policies will remain until those five countries will be united and 
open to trade, which China consequently, is aiming to achieve.  
 
 Country Case: Uzbekistan economy and OBOR initiatives  
 
The former Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan has, for the last 25 years, been known as 
closed with the authoritarian political regime of former president Islam Karimov. The 
country’s national economy and geopolitical policies was ruled with a high level of 
autonomy. (Diener 2015: 21). Following independence in 1991, the president aimed to 
increase its national identity in the Central Asian region, and with this focus, it 
emphasized the development of four areas: first, creation of single system of power 
based on institutions created by Islam Kasimov; second, design of a strong centralised 
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state in CA region; third, promote Uzbek nationalism; and fourth, control the spread of 
religious radicalism in the country. 
 
 The implementation these development goals produced an authoritarian regime with 
unlimited powers of the president (Melvin 2000: 31-32).  The domestic regime was 
consolidated by suppressing individual independence and development opportunities.  
Since the political institutions were subordinated to Karimov, the country’s development 
was slowly eradicated in internal as well as external political operations. This 
consequently has restricted entry of foreign aid institutions, NGOs and investors.  
Therefore, in the beginning, China’s initiatives to enter Uzbekistan with political and 
economic strategies for mutual prosperity was challenging (Hongzhou 2015: 6), and the 
implemented projects were less than in other neighbouring countries.  
  
 As a political regime focused only on national security and identity, Uzbekistan 
participated in the formation in 2001 of a common connecting International organisation, 
the Shanghai Corporation Organisation (SCO) for security and economic cooperation 
and accepting OBOR project initiatives from China. However, the visible changes and 
regional integrations began to strengthen after the election of new president Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev in December 2016 (CAAN 2017).  
 
Uzbekistan has strong ambitions as a regional leader in Central Asia and includes the 
most diversified economy with 80% of mineral fertilizers, 94% of chemical fibres, 54% of 
natural gas, 59.2% of cement, and 65.5% of raw cotton (CAAN 2015).  Mirziyoyev began 
to rethink the strategy of its position among the CA countries, especially with initiatives 
to revive the relationship with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan3. As between these two 
countries Uzbekistan had unsolved problems which required the attention to stabilize. 
For instance, after two months of presidency, Mirziyoyev resumed the interrupted flights 
in 1992 between Tashkent-Dushanbe by easing the visa regimes between two countries 
and discussed of the construction of the Roghun hydroelectric power station (CAAN 
2017). 
 
 
3 The relationship between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had been deteriorating after gaining 
independence. The conflict with Kyrgyzstan arose due to the ethnic issues surrounding the large 
Uzbek population that resides in Kyrgyzstan, and its associated cultural and political status. While 
Uzbek-Tajik conflict arose due to the revival of the postponed Soviet-era hydropower dam in 
Tajikistan. The energy independence of Tajikistan would damage Uzbek cotton income by drying 
up the connected Amu Darya river.  
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In the new political reforms, Mirziyoyev’s main policy is to avoid the Soviet-era political-
economic model which was used by former president Karimov, and rather study the 
development models from the experiences of Russia, Kazakhstan, and South Korea. 
Adopting a more liberally oriented political position, Mirziyoyev is aiming to bring 
Westernized regime in the economy. However, it is challenging to implement the new 
Uzbek model while there is still existing rooted bureaucracy in the system (Bologov 
2017).  
 
As Mirziyoyev (Sattorov 2017) aims to create an Uzbek administration open for the 
accustomed public life, he is focused on enabling free criticism and discussions against 
the government regulations in the media although people are not experienced in the use 
of free speech and argument against the government. New reforms and administration 
rules remain still unclear without clear strategy goals for the further development of the 
country. However, Mirziyoyev’s serious efforts to revive the economy from stagnation 
provides promising opportunities both for the internal growth and external operations 
where he has established better relationships with neighbouring CA countries and 
strengthened foreign investment opportunities (Sattarov 2017).  
 
2.3.1 China’s investments 
 
Strategic interests of Uzbekistan to integrate with CA countries have many potential 
economic developments for the country, and consequently, it is possible for China to 
emphasize its economic influence in exporting products and importing gas and energy 
from Uzbekistan. Since 2002, Uzbekistan and China signed bilateral economic 
agreements that increased investments in machinery, oil, and building infrastructures. 
According to the Ministry of Commerce, China is Uzbekistan's the second largest trade 
partner and investor. (MCPRC 2016). Today, China, via OBOR initiatives, is integrated 
with Uzbekistan’s plan for economic development. It is planned to invest in railroads, 
roads, tunnels, and other transportation projects (see Appendix 1).  In this context, China 
and Uzbekistan foresee mutual benefits arising from strong future economic 
developments (Maitra 2017). In 2016, the value of projects for Uzbekistan reached $6.83 
million with an accumulative turnover of $4.75 billion (Yu-Wen Chen & Günther 2016). 
Today in Uzbekistan the number of Chinese based capital enterprises is more than 600, 
where the majority of joint projects have been implemented (Maitra 2017). Apart from 
industrial related investments, the technological partnership began to produce the main 
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investment operations as well.  Today, the Chinese Huawei telecommunication company 
is the largest telecom provider in the country (Yu-Wen Chen et al. 2016). 
 
With ambitious plans to increase the economy in the country, already in 2015, the 
government of Uzbekistan announced a five-year plan to modernise its industries and 
develop new infrastructural projects in gas, petrochemical sectors, construct roads and 
airports, and build new railways (World Bank Group 2016). The following year, to 
enhance its economic cooperation with China, OBOR initiatives were signed to 
accelerate the infrastructure developments. Today, China has implemented a number of 
roads, railways and gas pipelines construction projects across the country 
(Reconnecting Asia 2017). And one of the strategically important fields of investment is 
in developing the country’s natural gas reserves and gas transportation infrastructure 
(Maitra 2017). For instance, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the 
Chinese biggest oil and gas producer has invested billions of dollars to import more than 
half of Turkmen, Uzbek and Kazakh gas supply to China. This recently finished project 
in gap pipeline infrastructure currently serves well by delivering gas from Turkmenistan 
passing by Uzbekistan where it supplies additional gas and delivers to China. (see 
Appendix 2) (Tang 2015: 7). 
 
Another important Chinese OBOR initiative is the construction of a new Uzbekistan-
Kyrgyzstan-China railway that has the potential to increase turnover for China in 
importing raw materials from both countries. In this case Sofia Pale (Pale 2015) explains 
clearly the importance of building the direct link:  
 
China has plans to use the Kyrgyz rail links to import hydrocarbons from 
Uzbekistan and earth metals, iron, copper, and aluminium ores, coal and uranium 
from Kyrgyzstan. 
 
The plan is certainly not complete connecting only two regions, rather the intention is to 
add strategically important countries for China’s economic benefit.  
 
Newly built railways create potential opportunity as it is planned to deliver the goods from 
China to CA countries crossing Uzbekistan and onward to Europe (Tang 2015: 6). This 
gives both China and Uzbekistan strategic economic growth and development. For 
instance, China and Uzbekistan have together developed an important rail link between 
Tashkent and the Ferghana Valley (a region in Uzbekistan) in which a newly built tunnel 
shortens the route without requiring any transit stopover to Tajikistan (Pale 2015).   
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Moreover, Uzbekistan in generating solar energies consider as the greatest among the 
CA countries. In 2013, Chinese Suntech Powers Holdings Co. Ltd and Uzbek state 
owned energy business Uzbekenergo formed a joint venture, where, the Chinese 
investment worth of $10 million was facilitating on construction of solar panel 
manufacturing in the country (Khurramov 2015). The initiatives of building the solar 
pаnels were successful, and already these days it is calculated to manufacture around 
50,000 of sоlar wаter hеaters annually (Daly 2015). 
 
China’s investments in Uzbekistan’s infrastructure development, especially in 
transportation, have an essential role in the economy. After the new elected president 
implemented new administrative reforms, China is able to align the relationship, and 
implement even more development projects in the country. This consequently brings for 
Uzbekistan a possibility to re-establish old roads and railways with new advanced 
technologies and the possibility to revive the stagnated economy. The development of 
transportation is the main focus area for Uzbekistan with the target goal to achieve it by 
2020. Since 2016, Uzbekistan has accepted new proposed projects from China to 
connect with neighbouring countries and expand the economic trade between territories. 
Therefore, the following chapter will focus on the theoretical arguments of the influence 
of transportation economic development in developing countries, concentrating on 
Uzbekistan infrastructure development as the case study. 
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3 Transportation and the economic development  
 
Uzbekistan is a landlocked country located in the heart of Central Asia. For the country, 
it is strategically significant to develop an efficient transport system which enables it to 
increase domestic growth and develop its trade with other CA countries, Russia, and the 
rest of Europe (ADB 2015). The Government of Uzbekistan’s long-term vision for road 
development regards it as the opportunity for economic prosperity by expanding access 
to regional and world markets that will improve exports, increasing Logistics transit 
transportation and providing new opportunities for the population (Ozbekiston Temir 
Yollari 2016). With this initiative, in 2005, the government implemented a time-phased 
strategy plan: “On the programme of development and modernization of engineering and 
communication and road and transport infrastructure for 2015-2019” to improve the 
development of road and other transport in the country (ITE 2015). 
 
  In addition, Uzbekistan is a part of The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation 
(CAREC) Program. CAREC provides the opportunity to receive investments from 
multilateral donor institutions for the development of regional infrastructure and the 
connection between countries to reach the global market. The initiatives have the 
potential development of integration between China, Japan, Russia, India, and Pakistan 
countries. This is also an opportunity for Uzbekistan to receive financial aid to prosper 
the economy domestically (ADB 2012: 1-6). 
 
Investing in transport infrastructure remains the most important area of development. It 
involves a significant contribution to production activities in developing countries 
(Setboonsarng 2006: 2-3). Several country examples and especially developing 
countries support the view that investment in transportation influences the improvements 
of rural areas by facilitating both growth and poverty reduction. However, the outcome is 
crucially dependent on the government policy provision regarding transportation 
development and measuring the impact with robust frameworks (Banister & Berechman 
1999: 33). Without the industrialization strategy supported by the government, it is 
challenging especially for the developing countries to sustain balanced economic growth 
and reduce poverty. (Cypher & Dietz 2004: 252) Consequently, the result will most likely 
depend on the choice of policy priority: poverty reduction or economic growth. 
(Setboonsarng 2006). 
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In the case of Uzbekistan, at the national level, the government is committed to achieving 
infrastructure development by focusing on poverty reduction through economic growth 
(ADB 2011: 22).  
 
 Infrastructure and rural development  
 
According to the World Bank collection (Tradingeconomics.com 2017), the villages and 
small towns that are remote from transportation and urban centres most likely will have 
poor household living experiences. In this case, Uzbekistan, with 63.64% of its 
population residing in rural areas, experiences extreme poverty risk of the population. 
(Tradingeconomics.com 2017) Agriculture remains the dominant sector and it 
contributes highly to GDP growth, although living standards have yet to improve 
significantly. Rural living standards are markedly different compared to those of urban 
areas. Poor employment conditions (lower wages) are matched by low fundamental 
provision of facilities such as such as electricity, water, and gas. The lack of access to 
basic needs constrains the rural area population from developing nonfarming livelihoods. 
This is further reinforced by limited management skills, inefficient marketing, logistics, 
and technology (see Appendix 3) (ADB n.d). 
 
The relevance of rural area development, roads and transportation infrastructure and 
services is particularly acute in rural production and trade between regions, impacting 
the social and economic linkage between cities (Creightney 1993: 5).  It implies also 
lower costs of production and marketing, where the delivery of products will be faster 
and more cost-effective (GIZ 2013: 18) For instance, purchasers can access easily 
producers via transportation links. Thus, it will also reduce farmer’s production costs 
including time and energy. In addition, accessibility of transport provides a possibility for 
agriculture expansion in areas where the land has potential for cultivation thereby 
increasing the farmer’s income growth and so facilitating the purchasing power of 
farmers. The availability of basic equipment needs for production improves the quality of 
cultivated crops. (GIZ 2013: 18) Development study research for India and Thailand 
revealed that rural transportation generates an income in the agriculture sector by 
developing continuously the nonfarm sector. This provides a series of opportunities for 
employment by increasing the wage of labour in rural villages. (Setboonsarng 2006). 
 
The increase of income levels develops significantly the economic opportunities in rural 
areas, benefiting the rural households. It develops slowly the nonfarming livelihoods by 
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increasing the new business fields based on the demand of the rural population (GIZ 
2013: 10). Moreover, it becomes financially affordable to use as well as to reach through 
the maintained rural roads established social services such as healthcare and education. 
This, as a result, leads to the improvement of maternal health outcomes, healthier rural 
communities, and increase of children’s school attendance. (Starkey & Hine 2014: 17) 
For instance, World Bank financing of rural road development in Morocco was shown to 
have provided access for children to attend school more often than before, and at the 
same time, for teachers to commute from town to villages, which increased the enrolment 
rate (Gannon and Lui, 1997: 36). 
 
The income growth leads to increased individual mobility and flexibility to reach without 
difficulty other regional cities based on personal needs. This also influences households’ 
consumption behaviour by providing an opportunity to get access to wider choices in 
goods and services, which are reachable via transport services and fulfil the basic needs 
for living. In the long-run, it will essentially influence on housing and employment 
locations as well since these will be chosen based on individuals’ optimal choices 
(Creightney 1993: 17).  It consequently will have an impact on developing the agriculture 
trade between regions by developing new employment skills in various sectors of 
business, depending on rural household demand.   
 
The process of growth influences the reorientation of the entire economic and social 
structure. According to the Lewis dual economic model. (Cypher and Dietz 2004: 253), 
it implies that during the economic growth, a country begins to experience a shift from 
predominantly agricultural level (primary) to higher industrial (secondary) productivity. A 
structural transformation occurs when the surplus of labour in rural areas migrates to 
urban regions where they become urban workers employed mainly in industry. In the 
case of Uzbekistan, it is already experiencing the transformation of labour from 
agriculture to industry and services (Cypher and Dietz 2004: 253). 
 
In practice, there has occurred mass migration of labour to Tashkent (capital city of 
Uzbekistan) and a corresponding shortage of labour in rural regions.  In rural areas the 
quality of living standards is low as are the facilities provided for education and health 
services.  The population in the rural area receives relatively low income (compared to 
the capital city) which constrains the accumulation of savings and enhancement of 
household wealth.  Therefore, due to the mass labour migration to Tashkent, rural areas 
are experiencing a lack of labour in agriculture, as are schools trained teachers and other 
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businesses. However, the provision of infrastructural projects around the regions 
provides employment opportunities in infrastructure services and generates income 
growth, which will influence future developments (Starkey et al. 2014: 14). 
 
3.1.1 Non – equal benefits  
 
While transportation serves the population needs regarding accessibility, improvement 
of agricultural production, commuter mobility between regions and provision of various 
social services, there is no doubt that from the revealed experiences, transportation 
developments could not entirely to provide all the benefits for the poor households.  
Gannon and Liu (1997) found that improved transportation in rural areas reduces poverty 
by lowering costs and increasing opportunities. However, there is no clear affirmation 
regarding the rеdistribution of wеlfare for the pоor population. (Starkey et al. 2014: 11). 
This is clearly explained by an ADB research report: “in countries where the distribution 
of income and opportunities is skewed, in general, it is the non-poor who benefit more 
from investments.” (Setboonsarng 2006). Certainly, the poor have significant benefits 
from the investments in rural roads, especially over longer distances. However, 
households with greater access to capital and resources have more chances to benefit 
from the improved transport infrastructures. (Setboonsarng 2006). 
 
The enhancement in rural productivity and changes in agriculture production means 
wealthier households tend to benefit more because they strengthen immediately land 
use via improved market access and other possibilities. Meanwhile poor households 
often need financial support to purchase relevant inputs to develop profitable business 
outputs. In most cases, these are unsuccessful anyway (Hasan Khan 2001).  Without 
government assistance to poor households, it is challenging to benefit as much as a 
wealthy household who has an opportunity rise land values and increase income growth. 
In addition, well established transportation should increase the possibility to access 
social services, but the poor households have relatively low access to those services 
compared to the non-poor (Cook, 2005:18). Even if there are affordable transport 
services or provision of subsidies, it is most likely that poor households do not receive 
the full benefits of these opportunities.  
 
In Asian countries, most of the poor are landless or unskilled households, and they are 
focused on receiving basic needs for subsistence. As the investment in transportation 
should increase poverty reduction and sustain households with unlimited resources, 
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however, the obstacles lie in the transportation policy and the goal of the investments 
which eventually poor households will have the advantage to reduce poverty (Hasan 
Khan 2001).   
 
3.1.2 Clear planning on poverty reduction   
 
In developing countries, the transport infrastructure is considered as the main 
development factor for poverty reduction. However, without clear policy design 
addressing the issue, usually, the benefits of transportation get distributed unequally by 
suppressing the poorest household’s possibility of income growth. These types of 
unsuccessful transportation development projects include several factors that are usually 
excluded during the planning processes. There are many factors that have considerable 
influence on transport infrastructure’s role in poverty reduction. These include 
governance, conflict between countries, population, density, resource endowments and 
climate. In addition, it is relatively rare that governments prepare separate policy 
documents for rural transport development. Such a plan is usually assessed within the 
general national transport policy documentations, without considering more detailed 
analysis (Hine 2014: 10). Generic assessment of rural development tends to prevent the 
poor population from accessing the opportunities provided by transportation (Hasan 
Khan 2001).   
 
However, effective rural transport planning can be implemented by addressing the key 
constraints of poor households’ development. It is relevant to explicitly identify the main 
impacts that poor households will be affected by during the infrastructure development. 
This could be implemented by initial poverty analyse assessments, where the results are 
included into developing project plans (Starkey et al. 2014: 20). 
 
In addition, choice of investment in transport development requires targeting and 
prioritization of the specific direction of investment that has the most influence on poverty. 
By choosing only the targeted direction from the types of transport infrastructure, it will 
have more potential impact on development. Moreover, in “addressing the question of 
what to invest, it is essential also to consider asking where to invest” (Setboonsarng 
2006). The above-mentioned experiments imply that the poorest households are in rural 
villages without access to basic transportation services, and by targeting these areas, it 
will influence the poverty reduction of poor households and their opportunities to grow 
(Hine 2014: 39).  
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Apart from the clear target and planning on poverty reduction, a range of policy 
documents will impact on rural road investment and maintenance planning. In developing 
countries, most transportation investments are received by a variety of financial 
institutions, and the management executed by local government or road authorities. 
Therefore, to avoid conflicting goals from the authorities, it is essential that the project 
planning is completed at the national level, where the documents will outline the key 
issues and the direction guidelines of improvements.  On the national level, the 
responsibilities of local government for the sector will be higher. It should prioritize the 
key issues and apply these with appropriate regulatory principles, which, as a result, will 
be more likely to achieve the targeted objectives (Hine 2014: 39). 
 
Uzbekistan, in this case, has for several years in a row received from financial institutions 
transportation infrastructure investments, with the possibility to improve the rural areas 
through the transportation services. For example, one of the donors (CAREC) has 
recently received a request from the government of Uzbekistan on continuing the 
assistance of transport infrastructure development, where The Republican Road Fund 
(RRF) is responsible for the financing, while the government prepared to accelerate the 
development plan of the National Road Development Program (NRDP) (ADB 
2015).  This project aims to accelerate economic growth through improvement of trade 
and traffic flows аlong the prоject roads. In the planning guidelines, the project is focused 
specifically on poverty reduction by reducing travel costs in rural areas, road accidents 
and providing employment opportunities in the short term during the construction of 
transportation.  Based on the provided information, the project plan aims to achieve 
overall poverty reduction by providing greater transportation access in rural areas. Better 
transportation infrastructure will help to achieve stronger domestic growth and 
international trade. However, the clarity of project remains undefined on how it impacts 
the poorest households. 
 
 
 Cross Border Transportation Infrastructure  
 
Earlier in section 2.3.2 was mentioned Uzbekistan’s geography and the relevance of 
developing regional transportation with its neighbouring countries. The isolated location 
of Uzbekistan, preventing direct access to the sea, and challenges to reach international 
markets, have impacted economic growth. As Sachs, Mellinger, and Gallup (2001) 
25 
 
confirm, the poorest countries in the world are those landlocked with long distance from 
sea trade (Fujimura 2004: 5). Sea-borne trade costs less compared to other delivery 
transport systems and so is more advantageous. In this context, landlocked countries 
experience difficulties in trade as the distance creates challenges including crossing 
other international borders without the ability to regulate the transport processes. As a 
result, the processes of both export and import operations creates more costs, making it 
less competitive (UN 2003: 5).  
 
In order to reduce trade costs, in both import and export operations, many developing 
and landlocked countries began to focus on the establishment of cross border regional 
transport infrastructures (Bhattacharyay 2010). In addition, regional trades between 
landlocked and neighbouring transit countries can bring compound benefits where the 
countries are committed to developing transit trades. Therefore, one early focus of the 
OBOR initiatives is to develop a regional relationship by providing constructed transport 
infrastructures. The development of cross-border transportation and associated regional 
agreements will have the potential to ease bottleneck issues. Countries lacking well-
established roads and railways will benefit from the improved connectivity brought via 
transportation infrastructure by enhancing trade operations, expanding benefits and 
reducing the costs (see Appendix 4) (García-Herrero & Xu 2017).  Uzbekistan has the 
potential to improve its transportation system both domestically and regionally by 
strengthening its exports to other country markets.    
 
The opportunities of cross-border transportation in landlocked countries might lead to 
mutual regional benefits by increasing economic growth and the strength of relationships 
between countries, especially in the case of Uzbekistan. However, due to the 
undeveloped political and economic relationships between CA countries, the expansion 
of transport infrastructure tends to lead in the short run to challenges for country 
integration and the establishment of trust. Therefore, cross-border infrastructure 
initiatives are complex and risky operations than merely national ones. (Fujimura & 
Edmonds 2006). For example, the level of economic development in different countries 
can create difficulties in synchronizing the project plans where the political and economic 
conditions of those countries might operate in a different way. In addition, the economic 
structure of poor countries might cause these to gain less financial advantages from 
regional trade agreements. As a result, the benefits will be distributed unevenly as the 
less structurally compatible policies of poorer countries influence the economic 
outcomes (Fujimura & Edmonds 2006). 
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In the case of transit transport across regions, border crossings are often major 
constraints. In developing countries, the procedure of border crossing is complicated due 
to the absence of well-established country relationships. As a result, it requires more 
obligations by providing complicated non-standard documentation which consumes 
extra time on crossing the border. Bad organisational structure and unimproved working 
skills in the transport field increase the complexity of transport transit operations, so 
increasing the costs of trade. Usually, the information of these constraints, incurred costs 
and time spent in transit are not delivered to policymakers, even though their impact will 
continuously influence their economies (UN 2003: 6).  
 
These issues can be solved by efficient national policy and analysis concentrating on 
possible difficulties during the transit transport. The economic collaboration of 
neighbouring countries in improving transit transport systems are necessary, and the 
commitment of developing transportation operations could be revealed by establishing a 
clear trade policy actions (UN 2003: 21). 
 
3.2.1 Cross border experience in Central Asia  
 
During the Soviet Union time, intra-regional trade was integrated between Central Asian 
countries. After the independence of the first two decades, these countries experienced 
difficulties in trade and production due to the hyperinflation of 1991–1996 which caused 
economic disparity and the development of political regimes and economic models. 
(Mazhikeyev, Edwards & Rizov 2014). As a result, border closures and territorial 
protection prevented free trade. With high levels of trade protection (especially 
Uzbekistan) in small trades, the countries faced difficulties in delays at border crossings 
where it is required to complete the process with unofficial payments to customs officials. 
High corruption at border crossings increased the costs of trade, preventing the 
development of regional and global trade and associated economic growth possibilities. 
(Grafe, Raiser & Sakatsume 2006) According to data from the WB Doing Business unit 
(Cooley 2016) it was revealed that Central Asia is considered one of the challenging and 
time-consuming trade regions in the world (Figure 5). 
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Figure 6. Required time for Import/Export trade across countries.  
(Cooley 2016) 
 
In addition, different trade policies have led to the exploitation of “potential arbitrage 
gains” (Grafe, et. Al. 2006) that resulted from various regulations, custom fees and tariffs. 
For instance, from the ADB analysis, (2006) Uzbekistan charged excise taxes on ice 
cream (200%), mineral water (100%), juices (70%), cheese and yoghurt (50%) and soap 
(20%) (ADB 2006: 27). 
 
Economic trade performance in Central Asia significantly depends on the political 
regimes. For example, the regimes of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan viewed 
as ‘‘centralist with hard autocracy’’, while Kyrgyzstan ‘‘dualist with electoral democracy” 
and Kazakhstan “populist with soft autocracy” (Mazhikeyev Edwards & Rizov 2014).  
 
The study of price variations in Central Asia analysed by Grafe, Raiser & Sakatsume 
(2006) revealed that the trade barriers between borders have resulted on price 
dispersion and these effects are mostly evident in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. This variation of prices occurs due to the volatility in the bilateral nominal 
exchange rate in trade operation on borders (Grafe, Raiser & Sakatsume 2006). 
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Because of trade barriers, border crossings remain obstacles to free trade and market 
integration between the countries.  
 
However, the trade performance of the region has since revealed improvements (Grafe, 
Raiser & Sakatsume 2006). In recent years CA countries have been more focused on 
improving economic performance and on easing policy restrictions governing trade 
between each other. The initiatives of New Silk Road project will further enhance these 
improvements via the development of new transport infrastructures (Karimov 2017). To 
realise these goals, there has been already focused effort on reestablishment of local 
highways and railroads, modernising the facility services in goods delivery and 
contributing on new logistics services (Rastogi, Cordula, & Jean-François Arvis 2014: 
34). 
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4 Transport Infrastructure as a pretext for Soft Power  
 
There is a widespread assumption that OBOR transport infrastructure investments will 
stimulate the economic development by providing political stability in CA countries. It is 
also expected that these will establish transport connections, transit products, and revive 
interaction (Sternberg, Ahearn, McConnell 2017). The recently reincarnated New Silk 
Road project reveals only the initiatives promising to impact on economic development 
with the strategic partnership of involved countries. Apart from the analysis of future 
changes in the so far published but otherwise unclear project plans, there is no explicit 
evidence of OBOR achievements with respect to country economic development 
(Morrison 2017). 
   
There is no doubt that China with its economic power invests only to projects that are 
strategically important and profitable. Thus, it systematically attracts the CA countries to 
its economic strategies to diversify their opportunities for trading partners (Toktomushev 
2016). However, CA regions with the current need of investments for the improvement 
of the economy are more eager to accept China’s offer of strategic partnership. This is 
because countries have the potential to diversify their economy and trading partners 
following economic growth (Tang 2015: 16). For example, Uzbekistan with a new elected 
president is eager to accept new investments in infrastructure for its own strategic plans 
(Sayfullin 2017). 
 
As earlier described (section 2.2), China’s strategy in Central Asia is based on a strategic 
relationship that considers those countries as its natural resource reservoir and export 
partner. It affirms that China has no interest in political intervention on a cultural and 
military basis where it could provoke political conflict with dominant countries such as 
Russia.  
 
However, big initiatives and investments are already revealing Chinese influence in CA 
via the building of new connecting railroad networks, and slowly adopting its soft power 
by spreading Chinese culture (Diener 2015: 382). Based on recent experiences in 
Central Asian countries, the cultural influence of China slowly expands by establishing 
Confucius Institutes to promote the Chinese language (Yu-Wen Chen et. al 2017). 
Another indicator of China’s soft power is to spread opportunities for the number of 
students to attend universities in China as well government officials seconded for short 
term training. These initiatives have noticeably expanded, especially for Uzbekistan and 
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Kazakhstan due to their close relationship and historical interaction centuries ago (Tang 
2015: 16).  
 
Moreover, the increase of China’s investments will have a greater chance to extend its 
influence via its own established enterprises in invested countries. Today, in Uzbekistan, 
several large industrial Chinese companies supply their own labour during the project 
implementations.   In 2010, the number of Chinese migrants counted in total 80,000. The 
labours were working as merchants and labourers in bazaars, electricity substаtions and 
minings and on constructing railways and roads across the CA territories (Pannier 2017). 
A large number of workers from China have resulted in domestic complaints due to the 
rise of competition and job loss in industrial services. The continuous expansion of 
Chinese small and medium enterprises become concerning for a majority of CA 
countries. However, Uzbekistan, for instance, to prevent the working migration flow, 
established a visa regime while accepting the Chinese investments (Beshimov & Satke 
2017). 
 
Despite Chinese labour migration to Central Asia, OBOR initiatives – by developing the 
transport infrastructure in rural regions of countries – are helping to reduce poverty by 
stimulating economic growth and enhancing the quality of life. However, the focus on 
improving the relationships with bordering countries isolates concerns about poverty 
reduction, social development and livelihood opportunities (Sternberg, Ahearn, 
McConnell 2017). Thus, new high-speed trains and constructed road infrastructures 
have the possibility to “circumvent locals” (Sternberg 2017) by suppressing rural area 
developments and so lead the OBOR poverty reduction initiatives to failure.  
 
In this case, domestic participation in the formulation of planned policy on national 
economic development is relevant for CA countries. For example, Uzbekistan, by 
accepting the cultural spread, labour migration and the strategic focus of China, is 
currently focused only on more opportunities for financial funding, consistent with its 
strategic goals concentrating on economic development. The continuous economic 
stagnation (even if official date claims the opposite), high poverty in rural areas and less 
employment opportunities in the countryside increases the focus of Uzbekistan on 
improvement of infrastructures and relationship improvements with neighbouring 
countries rather than on the expansion of soft power by Chinese officials (Sayfullin 2017).  
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In addition, highly ambitious initiatives related to OBOR might encounter corruption in 
CA countries, where it is considered as the most rooted and unavoidable problem. 
According to the report “The Worldwide Governance Indicators” (WGI) (World Bank 
2017), CA countries are experiencing ingrained corruption and lack of rule of law and 
transparency, which negatively affects economic growth. In domestic operations, there 
are financial leakages with government intervention preventing the democratic 
development of the economy. The absence of independent judicial authorities increases 
the power of political corruption in decision making. In addition, corruption prevents the 
provision of citizens with a high quality of goods and social services such as in health 
care, education, reliable electricity supply, and transparent border control. Instead, these 
issues will threaten the security of citizens by hindering their social mobility and personal 
economic well-being. The existence of corruption and inefficient government control will 
prevent realisation of economic opportunities, especially for the larger, more populated 
CA countries. (Stronski & Rumer, 2017) This particularly could happen with Uzbekistan 
with its high population (30 million).  
 
It is acknowleged that during the OBOR project implementations corruption will inevitably 
exist, resulting in the loss of investments and increase of project costs. However, 
Chinese officials have accounted for this before the project announcement, expecting a 
loss of their investments. The assessment for Central Asia is expected to be 30 per cent 
(Cooley 2017). 
 
 Mutual Benefits  
 
Central Asia has been and will remain as a strategic territory for China in terms of energy, 
security, creating new markets, a source of raw materials and transit channel 
(Moeseenko 2017). China's domestic initiatives reinforce geopolitical influence in Central 
Asian territories. Provided economic opportunities also consolidates developing a strong 
regional relationship and encouraging stability by preventing potential tensions. The 
contribution to regional development will help to prevent political and social 
destabilization which occurred earlier between CA states (Peyrouse 2017).  
 
CA states and China have mutual interests in developing the region’s economy, as they 
substitute the economic needs for each other without competing in the market trade.  For 
example, sourcing raw materials from CA are at the forefront of Chinese activity in 
Central Asia while at the same time for the Central Asian states it is an opportunity to 
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pursue large-scale projects (Peyrouse 2017). Despite the fact of this dynamic 
development of strong cooperation, a huge difference remains in the economic and 
demographic potential of both parties, which as a result facilitates the expansion of only 
one dominant party. This can be revealed in the annual trade turnover between China 
and the countries of Central Asia, where it reached almost $47 billion while China’s 
imports from the region were valued at only $5 billion, and most of these are raw 
materials. Thus, the relationship of China with CA countries will, for the time being, 
remain with the strategy: infrastructure in exchange for raw materials (Moeseenko 2017). 
 
Moreover, China, with the capacity to export the consumer goods to Central Asian 
countries, gains profit from expanding its markets, while distributed products with a low 
price suits the living standards of the local population adjusting to consumer lifestyles, 
whereas Western, Russian, Turkish imported products remain relatively expensive. It is 
particularly also reflected in the export of technological gadgets that allow low income 
households to take advantage of the low prices. Roughly 80-90 per cent of goods exports 
from China consist of finished and diversified products (Peyrouse 2017).  
 
Central Asia will remain as a strategic region for China due to the mutual interest in 
economic development and related political operations. China will actively invest in 
projects of the raw material industries, the development of transport, oil and gas 
pipelines, and energy projects by supporting all with financial credits and political 
cooperation. These operations enable China to avoid shortages of raw materials and 
maximize the region’s resources base for its own economic requirements. As a result of 
China’s investments – distributed to only transportation and pipelines infrastructure 
projects – the economies of the CA countries will experience a certain skew in the 
direction of the commodity sector by supplying only raw materials to China.  Alexey 
Moiseenko (Geopolitika 2017) in this situation suggests that Central Asian countries 
should adjust to the emerging market initiated from China and realise their interests by 
pursuing immediate benefits from the market change. And the expected consequences 
of sovereignty loss in economic and political regulations, CA countries should defend 
their national interest, where, as a result, the external threat coming from China will no 
longer be concerned (Moeseenko 2017).  
 
For the last ten years, there have been several research studies regarding China’s 
reincarnation of the New Silk Road initiatives and its investment in the development of 
transport infrastructure in Central Asian countries. Consequently, there are several 
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assumptions informing those investments with respect to the domestic interests and 
strategies of each party. However, whether it is considered a mythical reincarnation or 
not, there are already signs that the new infrastructure can deepen continental 
integration and improve the economy in Central Asian countries, which is a substantial 
need for their current economic development. These projects might lead to a 
reconfiguration of relations between stan4 states and provide an opportunity to easily 
change the routes of trading goods and transit stops.  
 
In this context, Brzezinski comments that China meets the expectations of Central Asian 
countries, and they are the beneficiaries of Chinese projects, which also strengthens 
their sovereignty and makes it "permanent" (CAA Network 2017).  Certainly, in a generic 
context, China pursues its own economic motives by investing in Central Asia’s 
development. Meanwhile Central Asia is welcome to receive financial aid for 
reconstructing the transport infrastructures in regions with potential opportunity to 
prosper the economy. The strategic pursuit of cooperation includes hidden political and 
economic strategies for both China and Central Asia countries, which as a result delivers 
mutually beneficial economic developments (Mariani 2013: 9).  
 
There are numerous economic interventions involved between both China and CA 
countries. Some research studies claim that China will remain as the main actor of 
economic development in the region (Kucera 2012), while others argue China’s larger 
goal strategies in external operations were importing cheap natural resources and 
exporting surplus production materials across the regions. It is partially true that China, 
in order to secure its economy with sufficient energy sources, is intending to supply them 
from CA countries. These natural resource reserves in CA will deliver returns for China 
by reducing the costs of dependence on maritime routes. 
 
However, the China – Central Asia relationship is not only conducted via the natural 
resource exploitation trade. Rather, China’s stated goal is to create a stabilized and  
 
 
 
 
 
4 The Persian suffix – “stan” meaning – “land of”  
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pеaceful international environment across the region and for its economic development. 
By providing economic development, China is also focused on stabilizing the relationship 
of CA countries which are also relevant for the security of Chinese regions such as 
Xinjiang (Mariani 2013: 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
5 Conclusion  
  
The huge OBOR infrastructural project, with massive investments in affected countries, 
remains without clear guidelines and strategic goals. As the project covers a broad range 
of development initiatives, the conducted research analysis is explorative without clear 
prediction or precise influence on the economy of involved parties. Thus, the analyses 
of OBOR focusing on particular Central Asian areas and the influence of invested 
transportation to those countries will generate opportunity and demand for further 
research analysis. It remains to be seen what sort of results the recently implemented 
infrastructures will result in the Central Asian economy.  
 
The development of transportation has the potential to influence the economy at the 
national level. However, the evidence provided above reveals that China’s investments 
are focused on its domestic strategies without clear transportation investment guidelines 
for the regions. This consequently leaves the question unanswered due to a lack of 
concrete evidence – how the transportation impacts on the economy of CA countries, 
especially that of Uzbekistan.  With limited sources about the OBOR project for 
Uzbekistan’s economic development, the collected research analysis is generalized 
concentrating mainly on the Central Asia region as a whole. The result of analysis reveals 
that the OBOR project is launched relatively recently, and invested in infrastructure 
developments that require time to register their impacts on the economy.  
 
There are multiple challenges in predicting clear results of OBOR projects, but due to 
the initiatives of Central Asian governments to receive investments that are financed at 
low interest rates, there is a shared recognition of mutual economic prosperity for both 
parties which emerge via continuous new project applications. This, as a result, will 
create potential economic opportunities for the countries by leaving unpredictable 
consequences of such initiatives. 
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Appendix 1. Implemented Road and Railroad projects in Uzbekistan 
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Appendix 2. Central Asia Natural Gas and Oil reserves  
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Appendix 3. Rural Area Problem Tree 
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Appendix 4. The flow of regional cooperation in landlocked countries 
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